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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
was unable to convince the court that the homestead claim previously filed by the
deceased wife was invalid. The decision was affirmed by the supreme court.
B's chances in this litigation might have been better if he had based his claim on
RCW 11.52.020 rather than RCW 11.52.010, even though some factual and statutory
construction problems might have existed under the RCW 11.52.020 approach. Under
RCW 11.52.020, the court may, if a homestead has been selected during the life time of
the deceased spouse, award such homestead to the surviving spouse. By proceeding
under RCW 11.52.010, appellant faced the necessity of showing that no valid home-
stead had been selected by his wife.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Horseplay-Course of Employment. The question of a work-
man's right to compensation for an injury sustained during a "horse-
play" or "skylarking" incident was presentd to the Washington Court
for the first time in Tilly v. Department of Labor and Indus.1 Tilly,
en route to the men's lavatory, "did some act or made some remark"
to a female co-employee, and escaped into the lavatory when she
began chasing him, armed with a wet paper towel. When he later
emerged to return to his work station, she renewed the pursuit. Tilly's
efforts to regain the sanctity of the men's room were frustrated by
the intervention of a male employee, who held him while his face was
washed by his pursuer. After a brief friendly scuffle, Tiny was
released, and the two men laughingly returned to the lavatory. While
attempting to drink, Tilly lost consciousness and died the following
morning from a dissecting aneurysm.' In affirming a judgment award-
ing Mrs. Tilly a widow's pension, the court held that Tlly was, as a
matter of law, in the course of his employment at the time of his injury.
Although the Tilly case is one of first impression in Washington,
so-called "horseplay" incidents in workmen's compensation cases have
frequently been analyzed by courts in other states and by many text
writers.8 The non-participating victim of horseplay is generally per-
mitted recovery,4 whereas the treatment to be given the participating
1 152 Wash. Dec. 111, 324 P.2d 432 (1958).
2 This condition apparently resulted from a reduction of the normal amount of
oxygen in the blood. The appellants, in their brief, conceded that the medical testimony
was in conflict as to the causal relation between the face washing incident and the
death. The court held this to be a concession that the jury was enttiled to find Tilly's
death to be caused by a compensable injury as defined in RCW 51.08.100. See Porter v.
Department of Labor and Indus., 51 Wn.2d 634, 320 P.2d 1099 (1958). For a discus-
sion of what constitutes an injury under the act, see Windust v. Department of Labor
and Indus., 152 Wash. Dec. 1, 323 P.2d 241 (1958); Comment, 33 CALnr. L. REV.
458 (1945).
8 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 23 (1952); 6 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION TEXT § 1614 (Perm. ed.) ; Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay Under
Workinen's Compensation Laws, 41 ILL. L. Rrv. 311 (1946).
4 Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N.Y. 170, 128 N.E. 711 (1920) ; Swift &
Co. v. Forbus, 201 Okla. 516, 207 P.2d 251 (1949) ; Hollingsworth v. Auto Specialties
Mfg. Co., 352 Mich. 255, 89 N.W. 2d 431 (1958).
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victim and instigator is still highly controversial. In his treatise on
workmen's compensation law, Larson has reduced the actual or sug-
gested approaches of the courts in such cases to four:5 (1) The present
majority rule, the "aggressor defense," resulting in denial of com-
pensation in all such cases; 6 (2) the New York rule, holding that even
the initiator or participant may recover if the horseplay was a regular
incident of the employment as distinguished from an isolated act;7
(3) that the instigator should be treated the same as the non-par-
ticipant, since it is the conditions of the employment that induce the
horseplay; and (4) that the participant should recover if, by ordinary
course-of-employment standards, his indulgence in horseplay does not
amount to a substantial deviation from the employment.'
In the present case, the Washington court appears to have adopted
the fourth approach, predicating recovery "solely upon the conduct
of Mr. Tilly in relation to his employment"9 and confining itself to
the question of whether or not Tilly was in the course of his employ-
ment at the time of his injury, as required by RCW 51.32.0100
Unfettered by the requirement which exists in most American juris-
dictions that a compensable injury be one "arising out of" as well as
"in the course of" employment,1 the court avoided the hazards of
placing horseplay cases in a separate category calling for the applica-
tion of a special set of rules. It is to be noted that the court refrained
from expressly classifying Tilly as a participant or non-participant
in the face-washing incident. The case indicates that one sustaining
injury through acts of horseplay in workmen's compensation cases
will be judged by ordinary course-of-employment standards.
The import of the instant case is twofold: not only does it suggest
the approach to be taken by the Washington court in cases involving
5 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2320.
6 See Horovitz, 15 NACCA L. J. 29 (1955), to the effect that the trend is away from
this rule.7 Announced in the case of Industrial Comm'r v. McCarthy, 295 N.Y. 443, 68 N.E2d
434 (1946) ; Note, 34 Coae. L. Q. 460 (1949).8 This is the approach recommended by Mr. Larson.
9 Tilly v. Department of Labor and Indus., 152 Wash. Dec. 111, 117, 324 P2d 432,
436 (1958).10 "Each workman injured in the course of his employment, or his family or depend-
ents in case of death of the workman, shall receive out of the accident fund compensa-
tion in accordance with this chapter... " 'Workman," as defined in RCW 51.08.180,
means: "every person in this state who is engaged in the employment of an employer
under this title, whether by way of manual labor or otherwise in the course of his
employment...."
11 For a distinction between "arising out of" and "in the course of" as employed in
workmen's compensation statutes, see Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensa-




horseplay, but it sheds some light on what standards the court is going
to invoke in determining whether an injury was sustained "in the
course of employment" for the purposes of the act. The Tilly case
manifests a return by the court to a more liberal construction of the
term "course of employment" and is thus a retreat from a literal appli-
cation of the frequently cited rule of D'Amico v. Conguista," to the
effect that a workman is not within the course of employment if he
is not engaged in the performance of the duties required by his con-
tract of employment or specifically directed by his employer." This
standard has been invoked by the court to deny recovery in several
workmen's compensation cases 4 and was given weight in Tipsword v.
Department of Labor and Indus.,5 just preceding the Tilly case. In
the Tipsword case a truck driver, who normally ate lunch wherever
his duties required him to be, was held not to be within the course of
his employment when he came in contact with a high voltage cable
while walking to a shady spot to eat lunch. The court denied his
widow a pension because of her failure to show "that her deceased
husband was engaged in the actual performance of his duties under
his contract of employment, the law as previously announced by this
court and acquiesced in by the legislature.... 2"1 In the Tilly case,
although giving lip service to the above rule, the court cited an early
Washington case, 7 decided under the original provisions of the act, 8
in holding that Tilly, in leaving his work station for the proper use of
12 24 Wn.2d 674, 167 P.2d 157 (1946).
'. Under our workmen's compensation act, definite conditions must exist
at the time of an injury in order to entitle one to the benefits of the act.
First, the relationship of employer and employee must exist between the
injured person and his employer... ; second, the injured person must be
in the course of his employment; third, that the employee must be in the
actual performance of the duties required by the contract of employment;
and, fourth, the work being done must be such as to require payment of
industrial insurance premiums or assessments.
D'Amico v. Conguista, supra note 12, at 679. (Emphasis added.) See Bridges v.
Department of Labor and Indus., 46 Wn.2d 398, 281 P.2d 992 (1955); Scobba v.
Seattle, 31 Wn.2d 685, 198 P.2d 805 (1948); Cugini v. Department of Labor and
Indus., 31 Wn.2d 852, 199 P.2d 593 (1948) ; Purinton v. Department of Labor and
Indus., 25 Wn.2d 364, 170 P.2d 656 (1946).
14 See note 13. For a strict application of the D'Amico rule, see Muck v. Snohomish
County Pub. Util. Dist., 41 Wn.2d 81, 247 P.2d 233 (1952), in which an employee was
denied compensation for injuries sustained when he turned aside from his prescribed
duties to aid a fellow workman. See Comment, 29 WAsHr. L. REv. 42, 48 (1954).
"c 152 Wash. Dec. 44, 323 P.2d 9 (1958).
16 152 Wash. Dec. 44, 47; 323 P.2d 9, 11 (1958).
1
7 Welden v. Skinner & Eddy Corp., 103 Wash. 243, 174 Pac. 452 (1918). The statute
in effect at that time permitted recovery for injuries sustained on the business premises
of the employer, regardless of th actions of the employee. Therefore, the statement in
the opinion that an employee en route to a toilet on the employer's premises was within
the course of employment was dictum.
Is Laws 1911, ch. 74, § 5.
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the lavatory facilities provided by his employer, was in the course of
his employment unless he unreasonably deviated from such purpose
to such an extent that the deviation could be said to constitute an
abandonment of his employment. The undisputed facts indicating
no unreasonable deviation, Tilly was found, as a matter of law, to be
within the course of his employment at the time of the horseplay
incident.
The Tilly case lent support to the court's subsequent decision in
Gordon v. Arden Farms Co.1" In the latter case, an employee, having
donned the uniform provided by her employer, left the ladies' lounge
and was on her way downstairs to commence work when she tripped
and fell, sustaining injuries. In holding that she was in the course of
employment at the time of her fall, the court cited the Tilly case in
repudiating a literal application of the D'Amico rule and went on
to state:
[I] f by any standard recognized by this court an injured person meets
the statutory test of being "in the course of his employment," this court
cannot by sheer repetition add a further condition that requires the
worker to be not only in the course of his employment, but also to be
engaged in the performance of duties required of him by his contract
of employment.20
The decisions in the Tily and Arden Farms cases indicate a return
by the Washington court to its earlier standard for construing course
of employment, which permitted recovery for an employe (1) engaged
in acts incidental to the proper performance of his work or (2) fur-
thering the purpose of his employer when injured.2 This doctrine is
in tune with the weight of authority in other jurisdictions and with the
true spirit of the act of providing "sure and certain relief for work-
men, injured in extrahazardous work... regardless of questions of
fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy."22
ToNi REMBE
1153 Wash. Dec. 31, 330 P.2d 561 (1958).201Id. at 37, 330 P.2d at 565. The court adopted the same basic approach to "course of
employment" used in the Tilly case, requiring "some independent act of the employee,
which has no relation to the employer's interest, and is solely for the employee's bene-
fit,... to break the so-called nexus and to put the employee without the course of his
employment."




Award of Additional Compensation-Expert Testimony. The case of Dowell
v. Department of Labor and Industries, 51 Wn.2d 428, 319 P2d 843 (1957), involved
additional compensation awarded by a jury in an industrial insurance appeal. An
injured employee placed his claim for compensation with the workmen's compensation
board and received a twenty per cent permanent partial disability award. Upon
reopening the claim, the original compensation was affirmed by the board of industrial
appeals. The employee appealed to the superior court, and his doctor testified that he
was "permanently and totally" disabled. Witnesses for the board testified that he was
only twenty per cent disabled. The jury awarded sixty per cent additional com-
pensation.
On appeal, the supreme court HELD: A jury in an industrial insurance appeal case
may arrive at a verdict that lies between the opinions of the expert witnesses who have
testified. The court did not agree with appellant's contention that, since respondent's
doctor did not testify in terms of a percentage, the jury could not compromise between
the experts.
The difficulty lies in the definitions of permanent partial disability and permanent
total disability (RCW 51.08.150 and RCW 51.08.160). It is stated that although the
concepts of partial and total disability are different, both are alike in that they both
involve loss of working ability. The court defined permanent partial disability as a
partial incapacity to work, as measured by loss of bodily function (RCW 51.08.150).
Permanent total disability, said the court, is inability to work at any gainful occupa-
tion (RCW 51.08.160). On cross examination the respondent's doctor contradicted his
previous statement on direct examination-that the respondent was totally disabled-by
saying there were jobs the employee could do. He added that there were certain bodily
functions he could not perform. By describing them to the jury, said the court, there
was then substantial medical testimony, even though not given as a percentage of
disability, that supported a jury finding of an additional sixty per cent disability
award, and the jury did not need to disregard the doctor's testimony completely.
RCW 51.32.080 provides in part that the medical witness should testify by comparing
a disability not specified in the statute to the statutory schedule of disability which it
most closely resembles. The Dowel case holds that the expert testimony may have
probative value even though not expressed in terms of percentage and not given in the
exact terms of comparison to a schedule of injuries. The question of the extent of
partial disability is one of fact, and since the jury is the ultimate trier of fact, nothing
compels it to accept the exact opinion of any one of the experts.
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